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ABSTRACT 
This paper raises two questions to take a first step in developing a research 
agenda to assess the developmental relevance of responsible production, which 
includes both Fair Trade and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives. 
The first question is: How likely is it that responsible production becomes 
increasingly mainstreamed? After defining responsible production and 
contrasting the models and realities of Fair Trade and CSR, I present the rather 
optimistic ‘business case’ for a ‘race to the top’ which would also imply a 
further mainstreaming of responsible production. However, this optimism is 
put in perspective with some sobering observations about how the rise of 
China and India as centers of global production and consumption may well 
limit the reach of responsible production.  
The second question to begin assessing the developmental relevance of 
responsible production is: To what extent can we expect the ‘tool’ of 
responsible production to enhance developmental outcomes? Notwithstanding 
the limited overall reach of responsible production, I will argue that it might be 
feasible to develop ‘pockets’ of responsible production in which various 
stakeholders have found ways to selectively work together in order to enhance 
the localized depth of responsible production.   
The paper concludes with formulating some hypotheses for further 
research and putting forward the policy relevance of such research. 
Keywords 
Asian Drivers, Corporate Social Responsibility, Fair Trade, Responsible 
Production, NGOs, Labour Standards 
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ASIAN DRIVERS AND THE FUTURE OF RESPONSIBLE 
PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 1 
Exploring A Research Question and Hypotheses for Future 
Research 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a hot topic for both business 
managers and development professionals. Business managers, and a small army 
of consultants, are busy to develop and implement a multitude of standards 
and codes of conduct to convince consumers, and Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs), of their companies’ responsible behaviour. This responsibility is 
usually operationalized in terms of respecting and enhancing labour and 
environmental standards in the production processes of their suppliers in 
developing countries. In this paper I will raise two basic questions in order to 
begin assessing the development relevance of responsible production. First, 
how likely is it that responsible production becomes increasingly 
mainstreamed? Second, to what extent can we expect the ‘tool’ of responsible 
production to enhance developmental outcomes? In other words, these 
questions explore the quantitative – reach - and qualitative – depth - 
importance of responsible production for development.  
In exploring these questions two broad trends need to be taken into 
account. First, the rise of China and India, not only as the workshops of the 
world, but increasingly also as the spiders-in-the-web of major global value 
chains. For example, Chinese value chain organizers are increasingly setting 
standards and/or making existing standards applicable or irrelevant, and we do 
not know enough about how the entry of China and India in the global 
economy affects the relevance of for example ILO and FSC standards 
(Schmitz 2006, p 55). Second, a significant number of new middle-income 
consumers from ‘production’ countries are entering the global consumption 
market. So far attention on the consumer side has focused on the roughly 800 
million middle-income consumers in OECD countries. However, another 600 
million to one-and-a-half billion middle-income consumers from the Global 
South (most visible in countries like China, India, South Africa, Brazil) are 
likely to have started to significantly influence global consumption patterns. 
We do not yet know much about the extent to which these new middle-income 
consumers are more or less or similarly inclined to responsible consumption 
behaviour, nor do we know much about whether CSOs in these ‘new’ 
consumption countries will be able to effectively wield their potential ‘power 
of activism’ (Spar & La Mure 2003) to push companies towards more 
responsible production. Moreover, one can assume that the spiders-in-the-web 
in the global production system will anticipate newly evolving global consumer 
patterns. In short, we need additional insights in these interconnected trends of 
global production and consumption patterns to be able to better assess the 
potential reach and depth of labour and environmental standards. 
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Therefore, my general objective is to investigate how the interaction 
between a) the doubling in numbers of global consumers with middle-income 
purchasing power, and b) the changes in global value chain governance 
impacts upon the depth and reach of labour and environmental standards. A 
practical aim of this research program is to provide policy-relevant insights to 
civil society organizations and policy makers to enable them to more effectively 
use the means of labour and environmental standards in order to enhance their 
developmental ends (poverty reduction and/or environmental sustainability). 
The present draft paper takes only a first step in developing this ambitious 
research agenda by critically assessing the reach and depth of labour standards. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a definition of 
responsible production, of Fair Trade and of CSR, it briefly contrasts the 
models and realities of Fair Trade and CSR, and introduces the role of civil 
society and state actors in responsible production. Moreover, it presents the 
optimistic ‘business case’ for mainstreaming responsible production. However, 
Section 3 puts forward some sobering thoughts to the idea that responsible 
production will be the way of the future, by showing how the rise of China and 
India as centres of global production and consumption may well limit the reach 
of responsible production. Nevertheless, Section 4 argues that it might be 
feasible to develop ‘pockets’ of responsible production which may provide 
relevant examples of how localised depth in responsible production can be 
achieved. Finally, Section 5 concludes by presenting the overall challenge for 
this research program and some preliminary hypotheses. 
2. RESPONSIBLE PRODUCTION: DEFINITIONS, ACTORS AND 
MANIFESTATIONS  
Confusion about definitions 
Defining responsible production, Fair Trade and CSR seems a simple first step 
in developing this paper. However, the confusion in the discussion on the 
definitions reflects the overall confusion in this area of work. Instead of getting 
drawn into a survey of the definitional issues in this booming literature, I will 
try to highlight very briefly the often implicit discourse clashes that thwart 
agreement on straightforward definitions. For me, responsible production 
refers to those situations where the spiders-in-the web of supply chains make a 
deliberate effort to include, throughout their supply chain, labour and 
environmental standards that go beyond the existing minimum legal 
requirements. In this way, I use responsible production as an umbrella term, 
encompassing both Fair Trade and CSR initiatives. While CSR is particularly 
important to investigate the likelihood of broadening the reach of responsible 
production as it involves usually large brand-sensitive corporations, Fair Trade 
initiatives are inherently niche activities that may provide significant 
demonstration effects of localised depth of responsible production when 
investigating how to enhance its developmental relevance. 
Many CSR definitions by management scholars do not only include that 
firms need to go beyond what is required by law, but also to go beyond the 
interest of the firm (McWilliams, Siegel & Wright 2006).2 I find this counter-
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intuitive and counter-productive, as the more sustainable achievements in 
responsible production most feasibly are to be found in situations where firms 
can actually increase long-term profitability and sustainability by engaging in 
CSR as a way to differentiate themselves and their products. In a very critical, 
forcefully argued recent survey (20 Jan. 2005), The Economist even goes one 
step further and argues that only the type of CSR where both profits and social 
benefits increase makes sense. Given their dislike of the CSR terminology, they 
prefer to label the situation where higher profits and increased social benefits 
go together as ‘good management’, so as to differentiate it from three other 
types of CSR which they feel are flawed.3 This type of ‘good management’ is 
what in much of the business-school CSR literature is referred to as the 
‘business case for CSR’. This implies a win-win situation, often without much 
emphasis on the inherent conflicts of interests among the different 
‘stakeholders’ in such initiatives. Another recent special issue, of International 
Affairs, on CSR by development researchers sheds a very different light on the 
debate (see eg. Blowfield 2005, Jenkins 2005). They argue that the development 
relevance of CSR will remain inherently limited in terms of reach as long as 
only internationally operating brand-sensitive firms in consumer markets are 
pushed to behave responsibly, and depth remains limited as long as private 
sector actors can get away with defining, implementing and evaluating what is 
socially responsible. 
The official definition of Fair Trade has been the result of fierce 
discussions within the movement, and presently is formulated as follows: ‘Fair 
Trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, 
that seeks greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable 
development by offering better trading conditions to, and securing the rights 
of, marginalized producers and workers – especially in the South.’ (FINE, 
2001) 
The reality of Fair Trade, inevitably, is more unruly. Even for the star 
product of coffee, it seems clear that it is far from easy to deliver on the very 
ambitious claims made in Fair Trade documentation.4 Moreover, and this is 
probably more important and structural, with their modest turnover and the 
volatility in consumer tastes, Fair Trade marketing channels simply cannot 
guarantee a regular demand for particular upgraded indigenous handicrafts 
from specific groups of specialised artisans from the South. Fair Trade can and 
does aim to upgrade such producers, and in some cases succeeds in assisting 
them to ‘get on the radar screen’ of mainstream buyers. Nevertheless, the 
overall picture seems to indicate that for local development in the South, in 
whatever sector, on its own Fair Trade cannot achieve significant reach in 
terms of mainstreaming responsible production by itself.  
These intrinsic problems related to the model and reality of Fair Trade do 
not render it useless. On the contrary, they have played a crucial role as norm 
entrepreneurs, setting an example of how international trade can (at least aim) 
to be done ‘differently’. Fair trade has played a catalytic role in raising 
consumer awareness, especially among middle-class consumers in Europe and 
the USA. It can be argued that the present fashionability of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) among leading companies, can at least partly be attributed 
to the pioneering role of Fair Trade. For the present research program, one of 
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the questions to answer is in what ways and to what extent Fair Trade can play 
an equally catalytic role among ‘new’ middle-income consumers from the 
Global South.5 
Also the CSR reality is quite different from its model and has many faces. 
In the last decades we have seen a bewildering proliferation of standards and 
codes, many of which relate to responsible production. A good and still 
relatively recent overview of various types of standards is given in Nadvi & 
Waltring (2004). Probably the best known example of CSR with a supply chain 
focus is the Ethical Trading Initiative, in which a group of well-known brand 
name companies work together with trade unions and NGO’s to ensure that 
labour conditions of suppliers ‘meet or exceed international labour standards’. 
A very recent and in-depth independent study on the Ethical Trading Initiative 
(Barrientos & Smith 2006, and at www.ethicaltrade.org) indicates that such 
international labour standards are successfully met for core workers in core 
supplier firms, but that the picture becomes more variegated for indirectly 
employed workers or for smaller firms and farmers who supply to core 
suppliers of global buyers. While ETI has perhaps received most publicity, 
many other Multi Stakeholder Initiatives (MSIs) exist. Among MSIs a 
convergence towards some of the ILO core standards can be seen. Most MSIs 
include health and safety, working hours, equal treatment of women, and child 
labour. Controversial remain operationalizations of freedom of association, 
wage levels (minimum vs prevailing vs living) and the scope of non-
discrimination clauses (O’Rourke 2006). Further and broader convergence is in 
the air, as many initiatives may be absorbed in the upcoming new ISO 26000 
on Social Responsibility, which is expected to be launched in 2008 or 2009.  
The role of CSOs in responsible production 
Next to private and state actors, a variety of civil society organisations (CSOs) 
can play a role in responsible production, like NGOs, Labour or Trade Unions, 
Community Based Organisations, Social Movements, and Consumer 
Organisations. CSOs possess fewer sources of power as compared to 
governments and private sector companies.6 Nevertheless, CSOs have often 
succeeded to make a difference, and to effectively wield their power of 
persuasion and threat of exposure (Spar & La Mure 2003), even to the extent 
that some of the more recent literature points at the often assumed but 
unsubstantiated legitimacy of CSOs to speak on behalf of ‘the poor’ or ‘the 
oppressed’ or ‘the concerned’ or other relatively vague constituencies (Gereffi 
et al 2001). In any case, it seems safe to assume that CSOs have played, and 
will continue to play an important role in the area of promoting responsible 
production and consumption, as soft power plays a crucial role in consumption 
behaviour. CSOs have the potential to act as catalysts of change in introducing 
new norms in consumption behaviour, to punch beyond their weight, and to 
push for norms to become more mainstreamed.  
Norm Life Cycle Model 
A useful tool to analyze the process of how new norms can become 
mainstreamed is the Norm Life Cycle model by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 
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898).7 They distinguish three stages: norm emergence, norm cascading, and 
norm internalization, with a key role assigned to the ‘norm tipping’ that takes 
place between the first and second stage (Segerlund 2005, 5). In the first stage 
of norm emergence, altruism, empathy, idealism and commitment are seen as 
the main motives for ‘norm entrepreneurs’ to push for example for better 
labour standards. Once a certain critical mass of key companies have adopted 
such a norm, ‘norm tipping’ brings us to the second stage of norm cascading in 
which legitimacy, reputation, and esteem become the main motives of 
companies to join what is now seen as ‘the right thing to do’. In the third stage 
of norm internalization the new norm has become a generally accepted 
minimal standard that all participants need to conform to, and at this stage for 
example new laws on minimum labour standards can further institutionalize 
the now generally accepted new norm.  
A CSO classification 
This schematic norm life cycle model can help to position the various roles of 
CSOs in responsible production and consumption. Some CSOs are squarely 
placed in the first stage of norm emergence, where they aim to show how ‘it’ 
can be done differently. For example, Fair Trade aims to show how 
international trade with poor producers in developing countries can also be 
based on more equal, more respectful trading relationships with an explicit aim 
to deliver more benefits to local producers). Next, Action/ Campaigning 
organizations like Greenpeace that use a ‘blaming and shaming’ approach to 
force mainstream companies to behave more socially responsible. Others like 
the Clean Clothes Campaign aim to push forerunner companies involved in 
MSIs to play a role as trend setters with a focus on depth and norm setting, as 
part of creating a critical mass to bring us closer to the ‘norm tipping point’. In 
contrast, other civil society organizations, like for example Solidaridad, might 
aim predominantly for increased reach and can be positioned in the norm 
cascade stage, where they aim to convince broader (and more ‘conservative’) 
mainstream business initiatives of the need to ‘join the responsible crowd’ and 
to adopt ‘realistic minimal’ standards in order not to jeopardize their legitimacy 
and reputation.8  
Role of government in responsible production 
The role of the state in responsible production is often forgotten or dismissed, 
but there is no way around including state actors. Private sector actors need 
government to set the rules to which private actors can comply. This quite 
basic observation seems to have gone out of fashion and hardly gets any 
attention in much of the CSR literature.9 Still, I would not be surprised when 
both Karl Marx and Adam Smith would have agreed that the role of the 
government is crucial in enforcing responsible production and ensuring 
developmental outcomes, even though their argumentation would differ. 
Marxists would argue that while individual capitalists may be inclined not 
deliberately to destroy labour – by paying less than the reproduction wage – 
but because their dominant logic is to make profits in the short run, and they 
assume that all other capitalists will behave similarly, they will collectively drive 
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wages down below the reproduction wage, unless the state steps in to regulate, 
and/ or when workers can enforce ‘higher’ wage levels through collective 
bargaining. Classical economists would argue that the invisible hand in the 
market would ensure developmental outcomes, given a ‘few’ preconditions: 
economic interaction is voluntary, competition is allowed to function properly, 
and externalities are addressed. Governments have a key role in ensuring these 
preconditions: for example to provide independent judiciary to ensure 
voluntary economic interactions, to fight anti-competitive behaviour in for 
example cartels, and to regulate how to address and compensate for 
externalities. In short, to ensure the development relevance of responsible 
production, a key role of state actors is inevitable. The question is not whether 
the government should be involved in these processes, but how to work 
towards a more feasible and effective role for governments in responsible 
production (Fox 2004, Graham & Woods 2006, Moon 2004), which will be 
elaborated upon in Section 4.    
The business case for CSR and the race to the top 
Within both the CSR-minded business community and among NGOs engaged 
in stimulating responsible production, optimism reigns. They differ on how 
fast and how deep responsible production should or could penetrate, but they 
agree on the logic of the basic direction. While many business managers are 
wary to go ‘too fast’ and to run ‘ahead of the troops’, most NGOs feel that 
changes come too slowly. Nevertheless, also most NGOs feel they are on the 
right track, and that what needs to be done is to get more companies to 
embrace more responsible standards as the way of the future.  
The underlying business logic, next to the social or environmental 
benefits, is that of high-road causality thinking, which is based on the idea that 
in situations of quality-driven competition it pays to invest in workers – and 
thus offer relatively better labour conditions - in order to achieve continuous 
improvements. Such workers become increasingly skilled, relatively scarce, and 
possess significant tacit knowledge. Such a conceptualization of workers clearly 
has its merits in an increasingly knowledge-intensive globalising economy. 
However, one should be careful not to over-generalize the extent to which 
such a conceptualization offers a useful model to understand labour conditions 
in developing economies (Knorringa & Pegler 2006). The high-road causality 
logic holds in some sub-sectors and for specific higher market segments, but 
amounts to wishful thinking for the bulk of labour-intensive low-cost export-
oriented production.  
Another key problem with the high-road causality logic is that it seems to 
require already a certain critical mass of responsible producers, i.e. the norm 
cascading stage, so that many not-yet responsible producers with self-respect 
feel inclined to join the high-road. This also becomes clear in the to my 
knowledge most forceful formulation of the business case for responsible 
production, which has been made by Sabel, O’Rourke and Fung (2000) in a 
paper called ‘Ratcheting Labour Standards: Regulation for Continuous 
Improvement in the global Workplace.’ They use the language of the New 
Competition and Total Quality Management to put forward the idea of a race-
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to-the-top by companies competing not only on quality, diversity, innovation 
and price, but also on their social achievements. In their words:  
The impressive gains that have been achieved in product quality, diversity, price, 
and innovation in global markets can, we assert, be extended to focus these 
disciplines on the improvement of labour and environmental conditions, and 
social performance more generally. We offer “Ratcheting Labour Standards 
(RLS): as a regulatory strategy that…. attempts to redirect some of these energies 
towards the advancement of social ends. (p. 1).  
Basically, they put forward the idea that when labour and environmental 
concerns are integrated into the core business model of private sector 
companies, the business community can and will mainstream responsible 
production.10  
Unlike a fixed-rule regime, which aims to ensure that all facilities exceed 
minimum thresholds, RLS establishes an on-going competition in which laggards 
pursue leaders and leaders attempt to out-do themselves because they know that 
no particular performance level confers lasting ascendancy. Though RLS begins 
with consumer taste and public pressure as its drivers, it should in time include 
the forces and resources of national governments and international organizations. 
(p. 2)    
Therefore, the RLS approach assumes a critical mass of ‘ethically sensitive 
customers’, towards achieving norm cascading in which legitimacy and 
reputation become the main motives for companies to want to join a self-
reinforcing process of high-road competition. Unfortunately, I find it rather 
far-fetched to imagine such a process to simply take hold at global level. The 
next section aims to put the mainstreaming optimism into perspective, using 
observations from the Asian Driver discussion.  
3. REACH: SOME SOBERING THOUGHTS ON THE 
LIKELIHOOD OF MAINSTREAMING RESPONSIBLE 
PRODUCTION 
While the previous sub-section presented the possibility of a self-reinforcing 
race to the top, in this section I will put forward some sobering observations. 
Below I introduce four main reasons, all of them related to the rise of China 
and India in the global economy, to be kept in mind when assessing the 
potential for an increased reach of responsible production. The first two issues 
are related to production, the last two issues relate to consumption issues. 
Production issues 
Firstly, gobalisation requires firms to be more flexible. Basically the need for 
more flexibility at the firm level is ‘passed on’ to workers in terms of more 
insecure and precarious labour conditions. Moreover, while core workers in 
final product producers and key supplier firms may enjoy responsible standards 
and improved employment conditions, due to increased outsourcing the 
proportion of such core workers seems to be decreasing. The overall picture is 
one of fewer core workers at global level, and more differentiation through 
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various layers within firms, through local subcontracting arrangements and 
through international relocation of economic activities.  
Moreover, some observers stress that firms and production countries are 
also facing the pressure of what is called ‘immiserising growth’11, where: ‘..., 
growing … participation in industrial activities – reflected in the level of 
industrial activity, the growth in physical trade and the increase in industrial 
employment – may in fact become associated with declining overall standards 
of living’ (Kaplinsky, 1998, p.4). This negative macro effect is not because of 
an inefficient allocation of resources, but because of the pressures arising from 
economic globalisation. Kaplinsky concludes that: “in previous eras, 
participation in industrial segments of the value chain provided the source for 
sustainable income growth. But, increasingly, in a globalising economy these 
industrial niches have become highly competitive, raising the spectre of 
immiserising growth’ (Kaplinsky, 1998, p.31). He argues that firms or countries 
need to identify and exploit specific rents from competitive advantages, but 
that the main lesson from recent history is that all rents are transitory and that 
new suppliers in GVCs basically carry out ‘rent-poor’ activities. Again, escaping 
from this immiserising-growth trap is something that might be achieved by 
some individual firms or countries, but the general trend is expected to be one 
of: ‘… declining real wages and declining real incomes in those countries 
specialising in rent-poor products. … The challenges thus confronting 
producers everywhere is to upgrade by appropriating whatever categories of 
rents are within their grasp, but to do so more rapidly than competitors in the 
knowledge that a rate of innovation lower than the average will result in 
immiserising growth.’ (Kaplinsky, 1998, p.34).  
Many observers may feel that the image of immiserizing growth paints a 
too pessimistic picture, especially when looking at dynamic growth in China 
and India. This is not the place to get into this debate. Suffices here to state 
that our argument does not hinge on immiserizing  growth to become more or 
less widespread. To assess the likelihood of mainstreaming responsible 
production we simply need to be aware of the basic capitalist business model 
which implies that a majority of firms in a particular sub-sector do not produce 
A-brands with high image vulnerability, but will continue to look for the 
cheapest acceptable price/ quality mix. Given the continued abundant 
availability of cheap and quickly to be skilled labour for labour-intensive 
production phases in GVCs, the market wage for this type of labour is not 
likely to rise in the foreseeable future.  
A second issue on the production side is that Asian (especially ethnically 
Chinese) intermediaries increasingly play a more central role in many global 
value chains. While the role of these spiders-in-the-web has so far remained 
rather invisible, they are increasingly taking a leadership role in the governance 
of a wide variety of global value chains, for both branded and unbranded 
consumer goods (Schmitz 2006). While A-brand consumer goods and A-brand 
retailers are very vulnerable to the ‘power of activism’ and have in recent years 
become pro-active in terms of responsible standard setting, this applies much 
less to the rather invisible Asian intermediaries who are more likely to 
downplay these logistically more complicated and cost-raising concerns and be 
at best re-active in terms of responsible standard setting. Given the increasingly 
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dominant role of Asian intermediaries, and their minimalist approach to 
responsible standard setting, this also makes it increasingly difficult for others 
to remain competitive through following a higher road towards responsible 
standards setting, except in premium market segments.  
Consumption issues 
I would like to raise also two issues related to the rise of China and India as 
global centres of consumption. First, the over-estimation of the relative 
importance that most consumers would attach to the labour and 
environmental impacts of the production and distribution of goods that they 
(do not) purchase. Many of the new middle-class consumers in the Global 
South, but also many consumers in OECD countries, probably attach very 
limited importance to these ‘additional attributes’ of the products they buy, if it 
means paying a somewhat higher price, except perhaps for identity products 
like clothing and shoes, and possibly for food and health products. Research 
indicates that relatively few (around 5%) of consumers actually use their 
‘consumption as voting’ (Shaw et al 2005), while it needs to be stressed that 
this type of research is still in its early stages in terms of representativity and 
has an almost complete OECD focus.  
The second issue is an implication of the ‘Bottom of the Pyramid’ thinking 
(Prahalad 2005). The Bottom of the Pyramid debate focuses on bringing 
another 4 billion relatively poor consumers into the global market realm by 
‘simplifying’ existing consumer products, to produce them at cost levels within 
reach of relatively poor consumers. From the perspective of this study one 
might argue that such a simplification of product attributes would probably 
leave no space for ‘luxury’ responsible attributes like for example an FSC label. 
In other words, also branded products will increasingly need to find a way to 
produce a broader variety of simpler products at lower price ranges.   
Adding up these two production and two consumption related points 
leads to a picture in which we are probably more likely to experience a further 
rise in low road production, and an increased differentiation within low road 
production, instead of an inevitable spreading of higher road production. Next 
to this increasing share of low road production we could envisage a significant 
market segment for some middle and upper income citizens that consume 
responsibly produced goods supplied by A-branded retailers, and an even 
much smaller niche for Fair Trade products consumed by particularly 
concerned and action-oriented citizens. 
Moreover, the fact that two large developing countries will join the ranks 
of the superpowers will not automatically lead to more developmental global 
value chain governance. Instead, it is perhaps more likely to lead to more hard-
nosed capitalism and ruthless competitive behaviour in a broader range of 
product ranges and market segments. What we may expect is a quite long and 
potentially volatile transition period in which the new global power structure 
works itself out (Humphrey and Messner, 2006). In conclusion, there seems to 
be very little reason to assume that a drive towards mainstreaming responsible 
production will gain dominance in this volatile situation.  
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4. DEPTH: HOW TO INCREASE THE DEVELOPMENTAL 
RELEVANCE OF RESPONSIBLE PRODUCTION 
The previous section argued that widespread mainstreaming is unlikely. 
However, this is not the end of the story. Somewhat similar to arguments 
made by Evans (1996) and Moore (1994) one might envisage a catalytic role of 
a number of  successful ‘pockets’ of effective responsible production, if and 
when it can be shown that localised depth of responsible production provides 
developmentally relevant inputs to processes of local development. Going 
against the odds, such ‘pockets’ of effective responsible production could set 
best practice examples, may stimulate further debate and provide CSOs with 
ammunition to influence public opinion and politicians on the need for more 
stringent government policies and laws to enforce compliance with specific 
labour and environmental standards. Such a strategy aims to reinforce norm 
emergence, and get us closer to the norm tipping point. Such a strategy implies, 
at least for the time being, a shift away from thinking primarily in terms of 
reach of responsible production, to thinking in terms of the depth or 
developmental relevance of responsible production. 
Not much work has been done on this perspective, but a few authors have 
started to at least raise the issue. For example Locke et al (2006), after studying 
one of the show cases of CSR, Nike, concludes that the existing codes of 
conduct, even when followed through consistently, do not seem to be very 
significant in terms of achieving developmental impacts. This is at least partly a 
result of the fact that the issues included in most codes reflect the interest of 
companies to be able to show potential consumers they behave responsibly, 
and do not often seem to reflect the priorities of poorer segments in the local 
workforce, nor local development priorities (Blowfield 2005; Jenkins 2005).  
In other words, private sector actors have been successful in setting the 
agenda and determining the indicators to measure responsible behaviour, but 
in order for responsible production to gain more developmental relevance, 
other actors like local CSOs, development professionals and engaged 
government officials need to find a way to start co-moulding this agenda and 
determining future indicators. Moreover, we need to recognize that these types 
of standards or codes can only be one element in a broader development 
strategy (Barrientos 2000). Codes that lead to improved labour standards in the 
export-oriented local factories can be a catalytic point of departure for other 
pro-poor development interventions, only if and when other local or national 
developmental actors can and will use this as a lever.  
But such a strategy is also risky, as higher standards may well push out 
weaker and often smaller suppliers that pay lower and more irregular wages to 
poorer workers. In response to standards by outside buyers, local firms tend to 
concentrate production in easier to monitor places of work and cut-off smaller 
subcontractors from their supply chain, either for real or only on paper. A 
similar process occurs in terms of labour contracting, where permanent 
workers or middle-men contract casual workers (often (seasonal) migrants) to 
take care of the more tedious work, without enjoying the benefits from 
working in a responsible chain. This may increase the gap between a relative 
elite of local firms supplying to GVCs with improved labour conditions, and a 
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mass of local firms ruled by low-road production in which labour conditions 
are not likely to improve (Gibbon and Ponto 2005). Even more generally, one 
might argue that attempts to enhance labour standards in these formal 
enterprises will only increase the gap with the vast local informal sector, which 
would reinforce exclusionary tendencies (Kabeer 2004).   
Instead, in order to work towards a more localised and broad-based ‘race-
to-the-top’, one might think of a localised version of the ‘Ratcheting Labour 
Standards’ idea (Sabel et al 2000, discussed in Section 2). In some localities it 
might be feasible to mobilize (among state, private, and civil actors) the critical 
mass needed for norm tipping and subsequent norm cascading at local level. In 
trying to achieve such localised depth in responsible production, we face a 
paradox. What matters most is not the highest standards, but a way to optimise 
the linkages with other local initiatives, to achieve broader and deeper localised 
impacts.  
From the supply chain perspective responsible production will only start 
to really make a difference, when firms integrate responsible attributes in their 
purchasing practices (Barrientos & Smith 2006, Locke & Romis 2006). 
Moreover, based on a case study of footwear suppliers to Nike in Mexico, 
Locke & Romis go one step further in arguing that this integration is achieved 
more easily in supply chains that are more quality-driven (as opposed to price-
driven) and where relationships are more long-term and less asymmetric 
(Locke & Romis 2006).12 
Therefore, to strengthen localised depth in responsible production, some 
local-global responsible catalysts need to convince and cajole local and supply 
chain actors to build realistic coalitions. One element in pushing forward such 
a strategy could be to connect to the emerging field of a more localised and 
actor-specific manifestation of the broader discourse on ethics and morality in 
development (Gasper 2005, Proctor 1998).13 This would also be a modest but 
important step in ‘universalizing’ decent work standards at local level (ILO 
2002).  
In this process of constructing pockets of responsible production 
government actors need to play a crucial but not necessarily labour-intensive 
role. In essence, governments need to set minimum standards, private sector 
acts as engine of growth and employment, while NGOs primarily act as 
watchdogs. In terms of the role of government it is often mentioned that 
governments might be relatively good in setting standards and producing laws 
and regulations, but that the main problem lies with implementation. Some 
innovative work seems to argue for giving other actors a role in the 
implementation, giving government actors the possibility to concentrate more 
on setting the standards. Weil (2005), based on a case study related to informal 
garment manufacturing in Los Angeles, argues that involving the buyers in 
monitoring minimum wage regulations in small subcontractor firms reduces 
the number of violations in paying minimum wages, and that using buyers to 
monitor increases the ‘credible threat’ to subcontractors. Again, this seems to 
work best in situations where buyers and suppliers have (a perspective of) a 
more long-term relationship. The key point for experiments with increasing the 
depth of responsible production is that this illustrates how one might creatively 
look at new delineations in the complementary roles of private, state, and civil 
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actors.14 In short, while the whole debate on mainstreaming responsible 
production is dominated by private actors, with CSOs ‘breathing in their neck’, 
the issue of strengthening the developmental relevance of responsible 
production inevitably brings state actors back into the equation.  
5. CONCLUSION: OVERALL CHALLENGE AND HYPOTHESIS  
NGOs working to mainstream responsible production face an uphill battle 
with an uncertain outcome but with potentially important developmental 
implications.  A key challenge for the program of research outlined in this 
paper is to confront the up-beat discourse on how NGOs play a catalytic role 
in mainstreaming labour and environmental standards, with the sobering Asian 
Drivers and Bottom of the Pyramid discourses that predict, for the foreseeable 
future, that Asian wages will not increase and that global value chains will 
experience an increasing share of low road production in which ‘luxury’ 
responsible attributes are not to be expected. In the end, this is an empirical 
question, so one of the key issues for further investigation is to explore, in 
specific locations and sectors, the net effects in terms of reach and depth of 
responsible production.   
To return to the research objective, and limiting myself to the labour 
standards that have been the focus in this paper, I expect that the interaction 
between a) the doubling in numbers of middle-income global consumers and 
b) the changes in global value chain governance will lead to:  
• a reduced overall reach of enforcing minimum labour standards in the 
global economy, and  
• an increased depth of labour standards in some alternative niches and 
in the supply chains of major A-brands for consumer goods.  
This also means that the ‘gap’ between responsible and ‘normal’ or ‘market-
based’ labour standards will increase further in developing localities where the 
first and second tier suppliers of A-brands are located. Therefore, it becomes 
even less likely that CSR initiatives of major brand-name companies can play a 
norm setting role in local economies, which also reduces the relevance of such 
standards as a way to enhance broader developmental goals such as reducing 
income poverty and achieving environmental sustainability. While this seems 
the most likely overall trend, significant exceptions to the rule might still be 
used to demonstrate in which situations responsible production can actually 
provide a stimulus to and become part of local development strategies that do 
enhance broader developmental goals. I expect that such best practice 
examples of pockets of effective localised responsible production will reveal 
innovative private-state-civil actor coalitions, cooperating where possible and 
recognizing different interests where necessary.    
Therefore, I expect this research to provide policy-relevant insights on 
where and when selective CSO pressure is more likely to generate positive 
developmental impacts. Moreover, such a research would also contribute to a 
better understanding of the newly emerging ‘division of roles’: the structurally 
complementary as well as partly conflicting roles of government, private sector 
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and civil society in enhancing development in a globalising world with new 
anchors.  
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NOTES 
1 The initial ideas for this paper were presented in a Development Research Seminar 
at ISS, November 23 2006. A first draft was presented in an Asian Driver workshop in 
Beijing, January 12 2007. I wish to thank participants in these events for thought 
provoking questions. A special word of thanks goes to Hubert Schmitz for 
challenging me to develop this daunting research agenda.   
2 McWilliams, Siegel and Wright, as guest editors of a Special Issue on CSR in the 
Journal of Management Studies, one of the top business school journals, define CSR 
as ‘actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm 
and that which is required by law’ (2006, p 1). 
3 These three situations are: 1) ‘pernicious CSR’, where profits increase but social 
benefits decrease (this is where governments have failed to appropriately regulate the 
economy), 2) ‘borrowed virtue CSR’, where profits decrease and social benefits 
increase (this is where shareholders fail to control managers who spend excessively on 
social programs), and the worst case scenario is both a reduction in profits as well as 
social benefits which The Economist labels as ‘delusionary CSR’. 
4 Especially in non-food products it is often impossible to actually pay a premium. For 
a recent study on Fair Trade in the Netherlands, see Knorringa 2003.  
5 Follow up questions could be: What role do NGOs in the Global South play, and 
how can global civil society alliances support the mainstreaming of labour and 
environmental standards? More specifically, what role can we expect for example 
Chinese NGOs to play, as compared to for example Indian NGOs, given the different 
trajectories and room to manoeuvre of civil society in these two main consumption as 
well as production countries? 
6 Traditional international relation literature identifies a hierarchy of sources of power 
(1) military power, (2) economic resources, (3) soft power, such as moral authority and 
persuasion (Florini 2000, 10). While governments can use all three of these powers, 
private sector companies can still use the second and the third, and CSOs are basically 
confined to using only soft power (Segerlund 2005, 25).  
7 This model was developed in the context of analyzing state behaviour. 
8 One important insight to take from this model is that various civil society 
organizations may play complementary roles in furthering the responsible production 
agenda. Unfortunately, many staff in civil society organizations look at this through a 
more competitive lens, and put time and effort in arguing about which role is more 
important or more politically correct, while a recognition of these complementarities 
might be a first step to develop more effective (tacit) liaisons, like for example the 
harmonized division of labour between Greenpeace and WWF in dealing with 
companies while working towards mainstreaming the FSC label.  
9 For a notable early exception, see Fox et al 2002. 
10 Interestingly and ambitiously, they spend a separate section on explaining how it will 
be more difficult but not impossible to launch a similar process in the informal sector. 
11 The phrase was initially coined by Bhagwati in 1958, and further developed in 
Bhagwati 1987. 
12 A study on comparing two footwear suppliers in China gave similar results in terms 
of better employment conditions in the factory with more network type of relation 
with the main buyer (Frenkel 2001). 
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13 This would be one way to address the present situation in which development 
standards are set and implemented by private sector actors (Blowfield 2005). 
14 For an innovative approach on how governmental and non-governmental actors 
may fill state capacity deficits, see Braithwaite 2006. For a case on government as 
possible driver of CSR, see Moon 2004. 
 
